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International regimes:
lessons from inductive analysis
Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins

Rising interest in the concept “international regime” in the 1970s is
much like that accorded to “international system” in the 1950s. It has be
come intellectually fashionable to speak and write about regimes.' Current
faddishness notwithstanding, the purpose of this article is to show that the
notion of regime is analytically useful, and that the concept is therefore
likely to become a lasting element in the theory of international relations. As
realist and other paradigms prove too limited for explaining an increasingly
complex, interdependent, and dangerous world, scholars are searching for
new ways to organize intellectually and understand international activity.
Using the term regime allows us to point to and comprehend sets of activities
that might otherwise be organized or understood differently. Thinking in
terms of regimes also alerts us to the subjective aspects of international be
havior that might be overlooked altogether in more conventional inquiries.
A regime, as defined in this volume, is a set of principles, norms, rules.
‘ See Oran R. Young, “International Regimes: Problems of Conception Formation,” World
Politics (April 1980): 331-56; Ernst Haas, “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International
Regimes,” World Politics (April 1980): 357-405; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power
and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); S. Brown et al.. Regimes for the Ocean,
Outer Space, and Weather (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1977); Edward L. Morse, “The
Global Commons," Journal of International Affairs (Spring/Summer 1977); 1-21; Raymond F.
Hopkins and Donald J. Puchala, Global Food Interdependence: Challenge to American Foreign
Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); Hopkins and Puchala, eds.. The Global
Political Economy of Food (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979); and Raymond F.
Hopkins, “Global Management Networks: The Internationalization of Domestic Bureau
cracies,” International Social Science Journal (January 1978): 31-46. The major focus of the
Council on Foreign Relations’ 1980’s Project on the construction of regimes is a good indicator
of the importance the concept has achieved in both academic and practitioner circles.
International Organization 36, 2, Spring 1982
0020-8183/82/020245-31 $1.50
© 1982 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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and procedures around which actors’ expectations converge. These serve to
channel political action within a system and give it meaning.^ For every
political system, be it the United Nations, the United States, New York
City, or the American Political Science Association, there is a corresponding
regime.® Regimes constrain and regularize the behavior of participants, af
fect which issues among protagonists move on and off agendas, determine
which activities are legitimized or condemned, and influence whether, when,
and how conflicts are resolved.
Several particular features of the phenomenon of regimes, as we con
ceive of it, are worth noting, since other authors do not stress or, in the case
of some, accept these points. We stress five major features.
First, a regime is an attitudinal phenomenon. Behavior follows from
adherence to principles, norms, and rules, which legal codes sometimes
reflect. But regimes themselves are subjective: they exist primarily as partici
pants’ understandings, expectations or convictions about legitimate, appro
priate or moral behavior. Such attitudes may exist in relation to systems of
functionally interdependent activites centered in geographic regions, as in
neutralization and arms control in Antarctica, or more consequentially, as in
western European international economic affairs. Regimes may exist in re
lation to a mixture of geographic and functional concerns, as in the interna
tional air transport system or in the international regulation of the uses of the
oceans. Or, again, regimes may exist in relation to largely functional con
cerns, such as the international regulation of drug trafficking or health sys
tems generally.^
Second, an international regime includes tenets concerning appropriate
procedures for making decisions. This feature, we suggest, compels us to
identify a regime not only by a major substantive norm (as is done in
characterizing exchange rate regimes as fixed or floating rate regimes) but
also by the broad norms that establish procedures by which rules or
policies—the detailed extensions of principles—are reached. Questions
about the norms of a regime, then, include who participates, what interests
dominate or are given priority, and what rules serve to protect and preserve
the dominance in decision making.
Third, a description of a regime must include a characterization of the
major principles it upholds (e.g., the sanctity of private property or the
benefits of free markets) as well as the norms that prescribe orthodox and
^ This definition draws upon a point made by David Easton, “An Approach to the Analysis of
Political Systems,” World Politics (April 1957): 383-400.
“ For example, Lucy Mair finds that regimes exist to prescribe and proscribe behavior even in
states with no formal government. See Primitive Government (Baltimore: Penguin, 1960).
■* Young, “International Regimes,” p. 340. In our sense, then, a regime is more specific than
structure, such as the power relationship of the North to the South or the distribution of power
in a particular issue-area, but is more enduring than mere historical case analysis of ongoing
issues. The reality of a regime exists in the subjectivity of individuals who hold, communicate,
reinforce or change the norms and authoritative expectations related to the set of activities and
conduct in question.
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proscribe deviant behavior. It is especially useful to estimate the hierarchies
among principles and the prospects for norm enforcement. These bear upon
the potential for change.
Fourth, each regime has a set of elites who are the practical actors
within it. Governments of nation-states are the prime official members of
most international regimes, although international, transnational, and some
times subnational organizations may practically and legitimately participate.
More concretely, however, regime participants are most often bureaucratic
units or individuals who operate as parts of the “government” of an interna
tional subsystem by creating, enforcing or otherwise acting in compliance
with norms. Individuals and bureaucratic roles are linked in international
networks of activities and communication. These individuals and rules gov
ern issue-areas by creating and maintaining regimes.
Finally, a regime exists in every substantive issue-area in international
relations where there is discemibly patterned behavior. Wherever there is
regularity in behavior some kinds of principles, norms or rules must exist to
account for it. Such patterned behavior may reflect the dominance of a pow
erful actor or oligarchy rather than voluntary consensus among all partici
pants. But a regime is present. Here, the tenets of the international regime
come to match the values, objectives, and decision-making procedures of
the pre-eminent participant or participants. A regime need not serve the
common or separate interests of every participant very well or even at all.
Slave states, as an extreme example, understand the norms and principles of
a bbndage regime, although they do not accept them voluntarily. On the
other hand, a regime only weakly buttressed by participants’ power or dis
puted among powerful actors may not consistently constrain behavior. Such
a regime may be in a formative or transformative stage, but evidence of some
normatively prescribed behavior would nonetheless confirm its existence,
however tenuous.
Regime distinctions important for comparative study
Theorizing concerning regimes among political scientists is now in the
“pigeonhole” stage (to put it more scientifically, we are currently “pro
liferating taxonomies”). After our initial excitement over discovering, or
newly applying, the concept and after coming near to consensus on the con
cept’s definition, we have moved to asking about analytic elements and di
mensions that might become bases for comparative empirical studies. Are
there, for example, varieties of international regimes, and, if so, how do we
distinguish between or among them? If there are varieties of regimes and we
are able to distinguish among them, what is the intellectual payoff in making
such distinctions and comparisons?
Furthermore, how does one go about identifying regimes? Our methods
differ from those adopted by some other contributors to this volume. In
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contrast to more deductive approaches, where regime tenets are derived
from postulates of general theory in international relations or from modeled
patterns in microeconomics, we induce principles and norms from evidence
of participants’ perceptions and find rules written in charters, treaties, and
codes. Evidence of participants’ perceptions comes from interviews, when
these are possible, or from writings and recorded reflections. We do not,
however, induce principles and norms from behavior, which would confuse
dependent and independent variables and lead to circular reasoning.
Some theorists suggest that what is interesting about regimes is similar
to what used to be interesting about “systems”—that is, their origins, their
structure, their impact on participants, their durability, and their transfor
mation. In addition, those who study regimes are also concerned with prin
ciples and norms, with their effect upon the patterns of behavior that con
stitute compliance and deviance, and, importantly, with the patterns of
reward and punishment that result. “Who benefits, how and why” and, cor
respondingly, “who suffers” because of regime norms are also central ques
tions. Categorizing regime participants as advantaged and disadvantaged,
and explaining why they are favored or penalized by different regimes, are
theoretically appropriate objectives. In raising this question we clearly as
sert that regimes are not benign with respect to all participants, and that
regimes can be “imposed” as well as arising solely from voluntary agree
ment.
Our examination of several international regimes suggests four charac
teristics of theoretical importance.
1. Specific V5. diffuse regimes

Just as systems must be limited analytically before they can be exam
ined, so too regimes must be intellectually mapped according to the activities
and participants they include. Regimes can be differentiated according to
function along a continuum ranging from specific, single-issue to diffuse,
multi-issue. They may also be categorized by participants according to
whether a few or a great many actors subscribe to their principles or at least
adhere to their norms. No international regimes command universal adher
ence, though many approach it. More specific regimes often tend to be em
bedded in broader, more diffuse ones—the principles and norms of the more
diffuse regimes are taken as givens in the more specific regimes. In this sense
we may speak of normative superstructures, which are reflected in func
tionally or geographically specific normative substructures or regimes. For
example, in the nineteenth century, principles concerning the rectitude of
the balance of power among major actors (the normative superstructure) were
reflected in norms legitimizing and regulating colonial expansion (a sub
structure), and in those regulating major-power warfare (another substruc
ture). Current norms that legitimize national self-determination, sanctify
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sovereign equality, proscribe international intervention in domestic affairs,
and permit international coercion, are all general principles of our world
order. They are reflected in a variety of more specific regimes, such as that
which governs the process of decolonization, and that which regulates the
global food system.
If such relationships between normative superstructure and substruc
ture are real, as we believe, some fascinating questions arise. What, for
example, explains the origin of the normative superstructures that exist and
persist at given periods in history? Why and how do principles of such dif
fuse regimes—the superstructures—change over time? Why and how are
principles and norms from diffuse superstructures integrated into the nor
mative and subjective features of narrower regimes? What is the relationship
between regime change at this substructural level and change at the
superstructural level?
2. Formal vs. informal regimes
Some regimes are legislated by international organizations, maintained
by councils, congresses or other bodies, and monitored by international
bureaucracies. We characterize these as “formal” regimes. The European
Monetary System is one example. By contrast, other, more “informal” re
gimes are created and maintained by convergence or consensus in objectives
among participants, enforced by mutual self-interest and “gentlemen’s
agreements,” and monitored by mutual surveillance. For example, SovietAmerican detente between 1970 and 1979 could be said to have been gov
erned by a regime that constrained competitiveness and controlled conflict in
the perceived mutual interests of the superpowers. Yet few rules of the re
lationship were ever formalized and few institutions other than the Hot Line
and the Helsinki accords were created to monitor and enforce them.®
3. Evolutionary vs. revolutionary change

Regimes change substantively in at least two different ways: one pre
serves norms while changing principles; the other overturns norms in order
to change principles. Regimes may change qualitatively because those who
participate in them change their minds about interests and aims, usually be
cause of changes in information available to elites or new knowledge other
wise attained.® We call this evolutionary change, because it occurs within
the procedural norms of the regime, usually without major changes in the
distribution of power among participants. Such change, undisturbing to the
® Ted Greenwood and Robert Haffa Jr., “Supply-Side Non Proliferation,” Foreign Policy no.
42 (Spring 1981): 125-40.
® See Haas, “Why Collaborate,” p. 397.
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. power structure and within the regime’s “rules of the game,” is rather ex
ceptional and characteristic mainly of functionally specific regimes.
By contrast, revolutionary change is more common. Most regimes
function to the advantage of some participants and to the disadvantage of
others. The disadvantaged accept regime principles and norms (and di
minished rewards or outright penalties) because the costs of noncompliance
are understood to be higher than the costs of compliance. But disadvantaged
participants tend to formulate and propagate counterregime norms, which
either circulate in the realm of rhetoric or lie dormant as long as those who
dominate the existing regime preserve their power and their consequent
ability to reward compliance and punish deviance. However, if and when the
power structure alters, the normative contents of a prevailing regime fall into
jeopardy. Power transition ushers in regime transformation; previously dis
advantaged but newly powerful participants ascend to dominance and im
pose new norms favoring their own interests. In extreme cases the advan
taged and disadvantaged reverse status, and a new cycle begins with regime
change contingent upon power change. Such revolutionary change is more
characteristic of diffuse regimes, highly politicized functional regimes, or
those where distributive bias is high.
4. Distributive bias

All regimes are biased. They establish hierarchies of values, emphasiz
ing some and discounting others. They also distribute rewards to the advan
tage of some and the disadvantage of others, and in so doing they buttress,
legitimize, and sometimes institutionalize international patterns of domi
nance, subordination, accumulation, and exploitation. In general, regimes
favor the interests of the strong and, to the extent that they result in interna
tional governance, it is always appropriate to ask how such governance af
fects participants’ interests. The degree of bias may make a considerable
difference in a regime’s durability, effectiveness, and mode of transforma
tion. “Fairer” regimes are likely to last longer, as are those that call for side
payments to disadvantaged participants. The food regime discussed below
functions in this manner. Furthermore, it can make a difference whether the
norms of a regime permit movement between the ranks of the advantaged
and disadvantaged, as with the ascendance of some previously disadvan-.
taged actors toward greater power over current issues in international
finance. By contrast, some regimes institutionalize international caste sys
tems, as under colonialism. We expect that regimes founded on more egali
tarian norms, and those that prescribe sensitivity toward mobility for disad
vantaged participants, would be more adhered to and less susceptible to rev
olutionary change. Many elitist, exploitative, and stratified regimes have,
however, proven viable for extended periods, and theoretical generaliza
tions must be carefully qualified.
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In the next two sections, we use the regime framework to discuss inter
national relations in two contrasting issue-areas, 19th century colonialism
and mid-twentieth century food affairs. Readers will recognize that these
two regimes differ significantly along each of the four analytical dimensions
we have elaborated. The colonial regime was diffuse, largely informal, sub
ject to revolutionary transformation, and distinctly biased in distributing
rewards. By contrast, the food regime is more specific, more formalized,
probably in the process of evolutionary transformation, and more generally
rewarding to most participants. Our primary intention is to highlight and
clarify our theoretical definitions and the variables we have identified as
useful for comparative analysis. Conclusions will push toward generaliza
tions concerning regime outcomes and patterns of stability and change.
Colonialism, 1870-1914
Though the subject of voluminous writing, colonialism, particularly
European colonialism as practiced during the last decades of the 19th cen
tury, has not been approached as a regime. Therefore, one aim of our study
was to seek new insights by subjecting an already familiar phenomenon to
rather unconventional analysis. Our other goal was to select as a basis for
comparison a diffuse, informal, highly biased regime that was transformed in
a revolutionary manner.
The regime

Historians identify the years 1870 to 1914 as the heyday of European
colonial expansion.^ Our analysis reveals that during this period the interna
tional relations of the imperial powers were regulated by a regime that pre
scribed certain modes of behavior for metropolitan countries vis-a-vis each
other and toward their respective colonial subjects. Save for the United
States, which entered the colonial game rather late (and Japan, which en
tered later and never participated in the normative consensus until after it
had come under challenge), all of the colonial powers were European. En
gland, France, Germany, and Italy were most important, but the Nether
lands, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and Russia also behaved imperialistically,
and characteristically as far as regime tenets were concerned. The “regime
managers” by 1870 were the governments of major states, where ministries
and ministers made the rules of the colonial game and diplomats, soldiers,
businessmen, and settlers played accordingly. In addition, a variety of sub’’ See, for example, William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 2d ed. (New York;
Knopf, 1972); R. R. Palmer, A History of the Modern World (New York: Knopf, 1957), pp.
613-59.
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national actors, including nebulous “publics” such as church societies,
militarist lobbies, trade unions, and bankers, held opinions on issues of
foreign policy and in some countries exercised substantial influence over the
formulation of colonial policy.®
The international relations of colonialism were evident in distinctive
patterns of political and economic transactions and interactions. Flows of
trade and money were typically “imperial” in the sense implied by Hobson
or Lenin: extracted raw materials flowed from colonies to metropoles, light
manufactures flowed back, investment capital flowed outward from Euro
pean centers, and profits and returns flowed back.® Elites also flowed out
ward as administrators, soldiers, entrepreneurs, and missionaries. They
went abroad to rule new lands, make new fortunes, and win converts to their
political, economic or religious causes. The flows of people were largely
unidirectional. Transactions were discontinuous across empires and
each—the British, French, German, Italian, etc.—became a politicaleconomic system unto itself.
But much more important than the characteristic transaction flows of
colonialism were the interaction patterns in relations among imperial powers
and between them and their respective colonies. There was a pronounced
competitiveness among metropoles as each country sought to establish,
protect, and expand its colonial domains against rivals. Yet there was also a
sense of limitation or constraint in major-power relations, a notion of impe
rial equity, evidenced in periodic diplomatic conferences summoned to sort
out colonial issues by restraining the expansiveness of some and compen
sating others for their losses. Constraint and equity were also reflected in
doctrines like “spheres of influence” and “open doors,” which endorsed the
notion that sharing and subdivision were in order.*® Therefore, what we ob
serve in international relations among metropolitan countries are numerous
conflicts, frictions, and collisions at points where empires came geograph
ically together, occasional armed skirmishes outside Europe, periodic con
ferences called to settle colonial issues, and countless bilateral treaties and
agreements between colonial powers that defined borders on distant conti
nents, transferred territories or populations, and codified the privileges and
obligations of each colonial power with respect to the domains of others.** In
inter-imperial relations, then, there were distinct elements of international
management over selected parts of the non-European world.*® This manage
ment rested upon implicit codes for managing colonies, rationales like
® Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (New York: Peter Smith, 1951).
* John A. Hobson, Imperialism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1938); V. I. Lenin, Imperialism:
The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York: International Publishers, 1939).
Rene Albrecht-Carrie, A Diplomatic History ofEurope since the Congress of Vienna (New
York: Harper & Row, 1958), pp. 207-226.
“ The events surrounding the Fashoda Crisis well illustrate this point. Cf. Langer, Diplomacy
of Imperialism, pp. 551ff.; Albrecht-Carrie, Diplomatic History, pp. 223-25.
Louis L. Snyder, ed.. The Imperialism Reader (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1962), pp.
206 & passim.
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“civilizing mission,” which were given credence, and growing willingness to
agree on imperial borders by diplomatic conferences.
With regard to relations between the metropolitan powers and subject
peoples, little equity prevailed. Commands, directives, and demands flowed
from colonial ministries to colonial officers and then either to compliant local
functionaries or directly to subjects. Deference and compliance flowed back.
Defiance usually brought coercive sanctions, with success largely guaran
teed by the technological superiority of European arms.*® The pattern of
colonization was typically characterized by initial economic exploitation
(usually by private entrepreneurs) and the arrival of religious missionaries,
followed by military expeditions and the imposition of political authority
either by coopting local leaders and institutions or by eliminating them in
favor of metropolitan administrators. The establishment of political author
ity was sometimes followed by immigration from the metropolitan country,
though the European outflow was seldom substantial. Colonial expansion
typically proceeded from established coastal settlements toward the inte
riors of Africa and Asia. It was hastened where rival colonial powers began
simultaneous expansionist drives in geographically proximate regions.
Colonization resulted in a pattern of outcomes that were advantageous
to metropolitan countries and especially to particular segments of their na
tional elites, disadvantageous to colonial subjects or at least to the majority
of them, and stabilizing to intra-European international politics. Colonies
brought wealth and resources that enriched citizens, enlarged national
treasuries, and enhanced national power. Overseas empires also brought
international prestige. In the colonies collaborating local elites usually ac
cumulated wealth and even power by supporting the colonizers.*^ But colo
nial peoples were generally exploited economically and certainly dominated
politically (although it must be noted that ruler-subject relationships were in
some areas less benign before European colonization). As for intraEuropean international relations, competition for empire became a surrogate
for more direct confrontation in Europe and accounted in some measure for
the absence of war on the continent for several decades after 1870. In addi
tion, colonial expansion and the global subdivision that ensued were in
themselves compensatory mechanisms that helped maintain the multipolar
equilibrium among the major states. Above all, colonization skewed the
global distribution of political autonomy and initiative as well as the dis
tribution of wealth dramatically in Europe’s favor.
All of this was surely pleasing to the colonial powers. While they bick
ered constantly over pieces of distant territory, none seriously questioned
the rectitude or worth of the colonial system itself. In the thinking of foreign
The Germans, for example, with their policy of Schrecklichkeit killed over 100,000 Hehe
and Herreros in German East and West Africa.
The Buganda, for example, expanded their territorial sphere within Uganda with British
support, thanks to their collaboration. See David Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962).
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and colonial offices throughout Europe, behavior directed toward acquiring,
preserving, protecting, and expanding empire was eminently legitimate. The
legitimacy of colonization was collectively endorsed by the metropolitan
governments and, after 1870, by overwhelming cross-sections of national
populations—including Americans.It was this overriding sense of legiti
macy, the convictions that imperialism and colonization were right, that all
means toward colonial ends were justified, and that international manage
ment to preserve major-power imperialism was appropriate, that contributed
to the durability of the system.
Norms of the colonial regime

The legitimacy in colonization was founded upon consensus in a number
of norms that the governments of the major powers recognized and ac
cepted. These subjective foundations of the international regime may be
treated under six headings.
a. The bifurcation of civilization. Looking from the metropolitan capi
tals outward, the world was perceived as divided into two classes of states
and peoples, civilized and uncivilized. Europe and northern North America
occupied the civilized category, and all other areas were beyond the pale,
save perhaps other “white-settled” dominions. Evidence of this genre of 19th
and early 20th century thinking is readily gleaned from the popular literature
and political rhetoric of statesmen of the day, where “we/they” distinctions
abound and where “they” are continually referred to as “savages,” “na
tives,” “barbarians,” “primitives,” “chUdren,” or the like.'® From this, it
followed politically that inequality was an appropriate principle of interna
tional organization and that standards and modes of behavior displayed to
ward other international actors depended upon which category those others
fell into. Toward the “uncivilized” it was reasonable to behave patemalistically, patronizingly, and dictatorially, and acceptable to behave brutally if
the situation demanded.'^ Toward “civilized” countries normal behavior
had to demonstrate restraint and respect: bargaining was an accepted mode
of interaction, concession did not necessarily imply loss of face, humiliation
was out of the question, and conquest for subjugation was not legitimate.
b. The acceptability of alien rule. The zenith of European imperialism
occurred before the principle of national self-determination became a tenet
Pratt, Expansionists of 1898; see also J.W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1812 (New York: Peter
Smith, 1949); and Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, pp. 67—96.
Ibid.; Edward Salmon, “The Literature of Empire,” in The British Empire vol. 11 (Lon
don, 1924).
Even as late as 1939 Robert Delavignette could write a book. Freedom and Authority in
French West Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950 [original French version, 1939])
based on this paternalistic view. The book gives advice to colonial officers on how to deal with
subject tribes and chiefs.
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of world politics, and indeed before Europe itself had largely settled into the
pattern of “one nation, one state.Therefore, the idea and practice of
elites and masses, government and governed, being of different ethnic or
racial stock, speaking different languages, and espousing different religions
and cultures were considered neither illegitimate nor particularly unor
thodox. Ethnically alien rule was also common in the colonized regions prior
to European penetration. Thus, the imposition of foreign rule and the
superimposition of white elites on indigenous elites were approved as right
and proper, especially when such behavior was also perceived as “civiliz
ing” or “christianizing.”
c. The propriety of accumulating domain. During the period 1870 to
1914 states’ positions in the international status hierarchy were determined
in considerable measure by expanses of territory (or numbers of inhabitants)
under respective national jurisdictions. Domain was the key to prestige, pres
tige was an important ingredient in power, and power was the wherewithal to
pursue a promising national destiny. The expansion of domain was therefore
accepted by the European powers as a legitimate goal of imperial foreign
policy and, indeed, reluctance to pursue such policies was considered unor
thodox; it raised questions about the according of status. There were, of
course, recognized limits upon imperial powers’ expansiveness, as for in
stance in generally understood injunctions against expansion within Europe,
into others’ colonial empires, or into others’ spheres of influence. States that
stepped beyond these limits risked sanctions.^® Also proscribed were colo
nial conquests of such magnitude or executed so suddenly as to threaten the
balance of power among metropolitan states. Nonetheless, expansion by
conquest through Africa and Asia was not considered internationally lawless
activity. On the contrary, it was accepted as respectable and responsible
behavior by major powers.
d. The importance of balancing power. Intra-European relations in the
late 19th century were stabilized by principles of a multipolar balance of
power (even though the bipolarization that would harden by the eve of
World War I was already in evidence). There was a widespread recognition
of the efficacy of the balance of power and a general consensus among
foreign offices that it should be preserved and perfected. This principle also
justified colonial expansion and it further supported the norm of compensa
tion.®” As a matter of right all colonial governments expected compensation
for adjustments in the boundaries of colonial empires. In fact, the agendas of
periodic international conferences on colonial matters directed discussion
toward formulas for comp>ensation, especially as European p)ower peneFor a discussion of the principle of self-determination see Robert Emerson, From Empire
to Nation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 295-362.
Snyder, Imperialism Reader, pp. 209, 297, 368, 372, & passim.
“ Richard Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics (Boston; Little, Brown, 1963)
pp. 220-73.
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trated the crumbling Ottoman realm and as imperialism extended into China
and Africa. Although often difficult to engineer, compensation was consid
ered legitimate and appropriate.
e. Legitimacy in neomercantilism. Economic exclusivity was a norm of
colonialism since, as we have noted, colonies were considered to be zones of
economic exploitation. Hence metropolitan powers endorsed their rights to
regulate the internal development and external commerce of their colonies
for the benefit of the home country, and, when appropriate or necessary, to
close their colonial regions to extra-empire transactions. Instances abound
where powers complained strongly about the protective behavior of others in
their empires, but as the latter decades of the 1800s wore on and free-trade
principles faded from fashion and practice fewer questions were raised about
the propriety of neomercantilism. It had become a behavioral norm of the
colonial system before 1900.^^
f. Noninterference in others’ colonial administration. As colonial do
mains were considered to lie under the sovereign jurisdiction of metropolitan
governments, external interference in “domestic” affairs was not counte
nanced. The colonial powers could, and did, chip away at each others’ do
mains via strategic diplomacy and occasional military skirmishes. But sel
dom did any one power question the internal administration of another’s
colonies. This was a taboo; respect for it resulted in mutual tolerance for
whatever modes of subjugation a power might choose to impose in its outly
ing domains. The slaughter of rebellious tribespeople in Tanganyika and
South West Africa by Germans in 1904-1905 was largely ignored in Europe.
We suppose, though we cannot actually prove, that one of the factors un
derlying this norm of noninterference was the fear of retaliation. No imperial
country could claim a record of completely enlightened treatment of colonial
subjects, since brutalities occurred everywhere, and exposing another’s
misdeeds might invite exposure of one’s own. There was, then, a “glass
house” effect in the collective restraints on both criticism and intervention
in internal matters of empire. Although the extraordinary and continuing
brutality of rule in King Leopold’s Congo was exposed in 1909 by investiga
tive journalism it was bankruptcy, not immorality, that led the Belgian gov
ernment finally to assert control over Leopold’s fiefdom. The details of life in
the Congo shocked many and violated even the lower standards of human
decency applied to “uncivilized” areas; but it was the breakdown of fiscal
solvency that was decisive.
It is easy to see how these various tenets of the colonial regime affected
international behavior. They abetted behavior directed toward establishing
relationships of dominance and subordination, rationalized conquest and
whatever brutalities it might involve, justified subjugation and exploitation,
impelled a continuing major-power diplomacy concerning colonial matters.
Snyder, Imperialism Reader, pp. 209, 304-324.
“ Parker T. Moon, Imperialism and World Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1928).
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and necessitated periodic conferences and continuing bureaucratic-level
communication. Such communication was aimed at limiting overexpansive
ness, providing compensation, and maintaining the balance of power, and it
had the effect of insulating empires from extra-imperial scrutiny and inter
vention. In this normative setting, colonization was deemed right and legiti
mate. It flourished.
There is little mystery about the basis of the norms that underpinned
colonization between 1870 and 1914. They followed from consensus in the
preferences of the major powers of the period, preferences that fundamen
tally preserved a global system that awarded great benefits to the major
powers. To deviate from the norms was to invite sanctions, imposed either
unilaterally, by particularly offended metropolitan countries, or collectively,
by the major powers in concert. For example, the collective suppression of
the Boxer Rebellion in China, in 1898, was a response to the Chinese infrac
tion of the “bifurcation” principle (the norm that endowed Europeans with
the right to establish dominance-subordination relationships).^^ Conversely,
to uphold the norms in one’s actions was to preserve the flow of rewards
from colonization, to preserve the European balance of power, and to pre
serve European ascendancy in the world.
The fundamental principles of the colonial regime were all challenged,
even in their heyday, and eventually undermined during the years after 1920.
By the 1970s dominance-subordination was considered an illegitimate mode
of international relations, alien rule had become anathema, economic ex
ploitation was ccmdemned and attacked, territorial compensation was con
sidered diplomatically ludicrous, and the internal affairs of empire (of which
only small remnants remained) became matters of continuing international
public disclosure and debate in the United Nations and elsewhere.Coloni
zation is no longer considered internationally legitimate, and current norms
of international behavior prescribe decolonization just as emphatically as
earlier norms prescribed colonization. Indeed, the U.N. Trusteeship Council
was set up to terminate the colonial system. There has been a profound
change in the international regime that governs relations between the weak
and the strong.
Why did the regime change? First, and obviously, the power structure
of the international system changed; western European power was drained
in two world wars; the United States and the Soviet Union rose to fill the
power vacuum; new elites had come to power in both the United States and
Russia after World War I and their preferences were distinctly anticolonial
(though for ideologically different reasons). After World War II, new power
emerged to buttress new principles and to support new institutions like the
United Nations, where anticolonialism, promoted by the Soviet Union and
“ Albrecht-Carrie, Diplomatic History, pp. 243-44.
*■* David A. Kay, “The Politics of Decolonization: The New Nations and the United Nations
Political Process,” International Organization 21, 4 (Autumn 1%7): 786-811.
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acquiesced in by the United States, was taken up by smaller countries and
proclaimed by excolonial states, whose ranks swelled yearly. A new global
consensus was formed in the General Assembly under pressure from the
Committee of Twenty-Four, and this held the tenets of the new anticolonial
regime that prevails at present.

Some analytic characteristics of the colonial regime
The international regime that governed tum-of-the-century European
colonialism was obviously diffuse, both geographically and functionally. Its
tenets pertained to relations among metropolitan countries, and to relations
between them and their subjects. Whatever the substance of relations among
metropoles, principles of exclusivity, compensation, and power balancing
applied. In metropolitan-colonial relations of whatever substance principles
prescribing dominance-subordination and abetting exploitation applied. To
the extent that there were also geographically or functionally specific sub
regimes operative during the imperial era, such as American hegemonism in
the Caribbean, the antislavery system, or intracolonial trade, they tended to
embody as givens the main tenets of the colonial regime. Interestingly, the
colonial regime itself embodied some of the more general principles of 19th
century international relations, as for example the central and explicit im
portance of power balancing, and the linkage between international stature
and control over “domain.” This suggests the hierarchical interrelationship
of superstructural and substructural regimes discussed earlier.
Managing the colonial regime was a pluralistic exercise conducted
largely by mutual monitoring and self-regulation practiced in national cap
itals. The regime was therefore, by and large, informal; there were few
codified rules and no permanent organizations. Periodically, foreign minis
ters or heads of states would assemble to sort out colonial problems, as in
Berlin in 1884-85. Terms of compensation and boundaries of political and
economic jurisdiction were spelled out in treaties that concluded colonial
conflicts, and the rights of colonizers and obligations of subjects were also
elaborated from time to time in unequal treaties between metropolitan gov
ernments and local authorities in outlying areas, which established “pro
tectorates.” But this was the extent of formalization for the colonial regime.
That the regime in its heyday lasted for nearly a half-century may be attrib
uted in part to its informal structure and policy procedures. Formalization
would have amounted to a spelling out of the rules, as for example those
necessitating compensation, and would have jeopardized major-power rela
tions by calling attention to constraints that rival governments could not
admit to in public. The less said formally, the better, and the more durable
the regime.
Little need be said about the distributive bias in the norms of the colo
nial regime. With regard to benefits among metropolitan rivals there was
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some sense of equity, bom perhaps of the recognition that the regime could
prevail only as long as major participants found it satisfactory; each, there
fore, had to gain something from it. But with regard to intra-imperial rela
tions, exploitation was the rule. More crucially, the rules of the game did not
allow for changes in status, nor for legitimacy in side-payments in return for
compliance. Unless they chose to grasp at occasional hints of “selfgovernment someday” or unless they were white settlers or collaborating
local elites, colonial subjects went unrewarded by the colonial regime. Yet
they played by the rules anyway, deviating only intermittently, mainly be
cause the costs of alternative behavior were kept prohibitively high by colo
nial authorities (or at least were so perceived by subjects). Nor was there
much expectation of assistance from the outside world, where strong states
accepted the legitimacy of colonialism and weak states would not challenge
the status quo.
While our description of the colonial regime only hints at its transfor
mation in the middle of the 20th century, the change was obviously of the
revolutionary variety. There was little changing of minds or goals on the part
of the colonial powers (save perhaps for the United States, whose govern
ment began to seek decolonialization almost as soon as the Pacific ter
ritories were annexed). Instead, counterregime norms took form in the
European colonies in the 1920s and 1930s as nationalist elites emerged and
movements were organized. The Russian Revolution created a formally
anti-imperialistic state, thus breaking the European consensus that sup
ported the principles of colonialism and modestly transferring power from
the forces of imperialism to its challengers. Two world wars in the first half
of the 20th century eclipsed European power and with it the capacity to retain
great empires. After World War II the United States became aggressively
anti-imperialistic for a time, thus shifting more power away from the sup
porters of the colonial regime. With the onset of the Cold War the United
States subdued its anticolonialism in the interest of western unity (but
Washington never admitted the legitimacy of empires). Meanwhfie, counter
regime norms prescribing decolonization had been legitimized and in
stitutionalized by the United Nations General Assembly and its subsidiary
bodies in the early 1960s. As the power to preserve the old regime waned,
the power to replace it expanded. Personalities changed, norms changed,
and power changed. As a result an international regime was discredited,
eliminated, and replaced. The transformation was nothing less than a com
prehensive change in the principles by which governments conducted their
international relations.

Food, 1949-1980

The current international regime for food emerged in the aftermath of
World War II as a result of several developments. The most important of
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these were the creation of international food organizations, the growth of
North America as a major supplier of grains to the world market, and the
creation and diffusion of more productive farming practices. We have al
ready described the resulting regime at considerable length elsewhere.^® The
food regime regulates international activity affecting production, distribu
tion, and consumption of food, and these effects are potent in nearly every
country of the world.
Food constitutes a functionally rather specific regime, at least in com
parison with diffuse regimes such as colonialism. Nonetheless, it conditions
diverse policies and activity. Food trade, food aid, and international financ
ing for rural development and agricultural research, for example, are all
affected by the principles and norms of the international food regime. In con
trast to the colonial regime, the food regime is more formal. Several organi
zations shape and spread regime norms and rules, and many rules are
explicit and codified. Formal organizations include two specialized agencies
of the United Nations, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the
World Food Program (WFP). Both legislate rules and enforce procedures.
Other bodies, such as the International Wheat Council (IWC), the Interna
tional Fund for Agricultural Development, and the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research, also help to manage the world food
system and uphold norms of the regime.
Many of the regime’s principles and norms are codified in treaties,
agreements, and conventions such as the FAO Charter, the International
Grains Agreement, and the Food Aid Convention. The norms of the food
regime are biased to favor developed and grain-trading countries, which
have long enjoyed special weight in the IWC and FAO forums. Still, in con
trast to the colonial regime, most participants in the food regime benefit to
some extent from their compliance with norms. The regime is now in transi
tion though, again in contrast to the colonial regime, change is taking place
in evolutionary fashion.
We refer to and discuss an intemational/ooi( regime advisedly, because
policy coordination among and within states is organized around food rather
generally, not only around separate commodities. Formal organizations that
regulate international trading in the agricultural sector do so as part of a
broad focus on food, and many procedures are standardized across com
modities. Much the same is true of trading in agricultural inputs and in other
functional tasks related to food. Agronomic research, for example, is inter
nationally channeled and coordinated by the Consultative Group on Inter
national Agricultural Research. Furthermore, most officials whose behavior
is important to the regime tend to be professionally responsible for food
affairs rather generally; they are not just commodity specialists. For exam
ple, the norms they accept relating to nutrition, hunger, and eligibility for aid
are based on food needs broadly defined in terms of calories and protein; the
“ Hopkins and Puchala, Global Political Economy of Food, pp. 18-27.
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norms relating to prices are based on market needs as affected by total farm
production, subsidies, and incentives.
For illustrative purposes we will focus on wheat as a key commodity in
the international food regime, mainly because the international economics
and politics of wheat have been thoroughly researched and we can therefore
discuss regime influences with some confidence. Wheat is the most easily
stored and substituted product in the world’s basket of foods. It is the pre
ferred grain of consumption among well-off people in most parts of the world
(though rice is still preferred by many in Asia). Wheat is suitable for both
livestock and human feeding, and, for its costs of production, compares
favorably with other grains and food products in delivering calories, pro
teins, and other nutrients. For these reasons, not surprisingly, the manage
ment of the world’s wheat supply is essential in adjusting the world’s food
supply through international mechanisms. Wheat constitutes a special subregime.^®
The national actors dominating the international wheat market since
World War II have been the United States and Canada. In 1934-38 these
North American countries supplied 20 percent of the wheat, coarse grain,
and rice traded, while in 1979 they supplied 70 percent.These countries
also held very large surpluses until 1972 (a byproduct of their domestic ag
ricultural politics). Their common interests led them to operate as an infor
mal duopoly. Together they controlled and stabilized international prices for
two decades, though at the cost of allowing the price of internationally
traded wheat to decline in constant terms by nearly one-half between 1950
and 1963-69.^® Other important actors in the food regime, as reflected by
their participation in the wheat sector, include 1) major producers and con
sumers such as members of the European Communities (EEC), eastern
European countries, and the Soviet Union; 2) other principal exporters such
as Australia and Argentina; 3) poor importers such as China, Bangladesh,
and Egypt; and 4) various international bodies such as the World Food
Council, the Committee on Surplus Disposal of the FAO, and the major
grain-trading firms.Some importers, notably Japan, import far larger pro
portions of their total consumption than many poor importers. Japan imports
over 50 percent of its food grains, 80 percent of its feed grains, and 90 per
cent of its soybeans.®® The economic strength of such industrial countries, or
oil producers in the case of OPEC, gives these importers a strong position in
For an elaboration of this point historictilly, see Wilfred Malenbaum, The World Wheat
Economy: 1885-1939 (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1953).
See the figures in Hopkins and Puchala, Global Food Interdependence, p. 36. The U.S.
share in this was about 80% and the Canadian about 12%.
“ See Alex F. McCalla, “A Duopoly Model of World Wheat Pricing,” 7o«/-nal of Farm Eco
nomics 48, 3 (1968), pp. 711-17, and Hopkins and Puchala, Global Food Interdependence,
chap. 2.
Dan Morgan, Merchants of Grain (New York: Viking Press, 1979).
Fred H. Sanderson, Japan’i Food Prospects and Policies (Washington, D.C.; Brookings,
1978), pp. 1-2.
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bargaining over food with major exporters. Poor importing countries, on the
other hand, even those that are 80 to 90 percent self-reliant, remain the most
vulnerable to international price changes and the least influential in shaping
outcomes in the food system.®^ Of course, in more concrete terms the par
ticipants in the food regime are not realty states and organizations but indi
viduals, an international managerial elite of government officials who are
responsible for food and agricultural policy within countries, and for bar
gaining about food affairs in international forums. Their network usually in
cludes executives from the trading firms, some scientific experts, and occa
sionally representatives from public-interest organizations. But its core is a
cluster of agricultural and trade officers. To take one example, the elites
responsible for negotiating toward an international grain reserve agreement
between 1974 and 1979, at least those most visible in London and Geneva,
were senior officials in government ministries of agriculture and trade offi
cials from the large grain-trading countries, along with delegation members
from producers’ associations and trading firms. The United States invited a
representative from an organization concerned with hunger to serve in an
advisory capacity, but the elites who determined the outcome were clearly
representatives of large, concentrated economic interests.^^ The negotiations
failed because consensus could not be mustered among the world’s food
managers.^®
Carrying the grain reserve story a step further illustrates the central
position of the United States in the world food system, and in shaping the
regime that regulates it. In November 1980, after the breakdown of interna
tional negotiations on the grain reserve, the United States adopted a fourmillion-ton emergency reserve of wheat. This unilateral reserve resulted
from a coalition of two interests. The first was the interest of wheat produc
ers, whose anxieties were heightened by the embargo imposed on shipments
of grain to the Soviet Union in response to the invasion of Afghanistan. The
U.S. Department of Agriculture tried to prevent a drop in prices from the
lost sales by using its reserve authority to buy up four million tons of wheat
(and ten million tons of com). But producers wanted assurances that this
grain would not be later dumped on commercial markets. The second inter
est was that of the humanitarian hunger lobby. It was largely organized after
Cheryl Christensen, “World Hunger: A Structural Approach,” in Hopkins and Puchala,
Global Political Economy of Food, pp. 171-200.
The one exception was Brennon Jones of Bread for the World. Key talks at the negotiations
involved American Agriculture Department negotiators who worked out their positions in con
sultation with Canadians and with representatives of American wheat farmers (the latter served
on the United States delegation) and representatives of the EEC (where French officials played
a leading role). Soviet Union trade officials also played an important contextual role through
clarifying their intentions but declining to participate in reserve obligations.
For some of this information we are indebted to Daniel Morrow. In 1978-79 he was Special
Assistant to the Under Secretary for International Affairs and Commodity Programs, United
States Department of Agriculture, and one of the principal negotiators working on the food aid
convention.
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the world food shortage of 1973-75 and had pressed for international re
serves for five years. The coincidence of the two interests in 1980 resulted in
a food reserve that by law could be released to food-aid recipients but not to
commercial customers. The creation of this international reserve marked the
first time that a stockpile of food had been held for release only to poor
people overseas on concessional terms. Its creation represented a minor
change in the international food regime that was, ironically, engineered by
Americans playing at domestic politics.

Norms of the food regime
In regulating food affairs over the last several decades, regime managers
have been able to find consensus on a number of norms. Some of these refiect
the overarching principles or superstructure of the state system; others are
more specifically aimed at regulating food transfers. Eight norms in particu
lar tend either to be embodied in the charters of food institutions, or to be
recognized as “standard operating procedures” by food managers.
Respect for a free international market. Most major participants in the
food trade of the post-World War II era adhered to the belief that a properly
functioning free market would be the most efficient allocator of globally
traded foodstuffs (and agricultural inputs). At the FAO and in other forums,
therefore, representatives of major trading countries advocated such a mar
ket, aspired towards it, at least in rhetoric, and assessed food affairs in terms
of free-market models. Communist countries did not accept this norm for
Soviet bloc trade, but abided by it nonetheless in East-West food trade. Ac
tual practice often deviated rather markedly from free-trade ideals, as the
history of attempts at demand and supply controls testifies, but in deference
to the regime norm these were either rationalized as means toward a free
market or criticized for their unorthodox tenets. The Common Agricultural
Policy of the European Communities, certain United States policies with
regard to supported commodities, and Japanese rice pricing have been re
lentlessly attacked as illegitimate and contraventions of free-trade norms.
Such practices are defended as “temporary,” “unfortunate but necessary,”
“politically imperative,” and the like, so that free-market principles tend to
be supported even in the breach.
National absorption of adjustments imposed by international markets.
This derives from norms worked out in the more diffuse trade and statesystem regimes. The relative price stability that prevailed in international
grain markets during much of the postwar era can be accounted for in large
measure by American and Canadian willingness to accumulate reserves in
times of market surplus and to release them, commercially and concessionally, in times of tightness. Of course, these practices occurred largely for
domestic reasons. Yet there was still the almost universal expectation that
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North Americans could and would hold reserves for the world and would
manipulate them in the interest of market stability. Hence this major
norm—that each group dependent on the market should bear, through its
own policies, burdens created by large price swings—was made easier to
maintain as long as North American reserves acted to prevent large price
variations.
Qualified acceptance of extramarket channels of food distribution.
Food aid on a continuing basis and as an instrument of both national policy
and international program became an accepted part of the postwar food re
gime. By 1954 it was institutionalized by national legislation in the United
States and by international codes evolving through the FAO’s Committee
on Surplus Disposal. Concessional food trade was given major impetus by
the United States’ effort to legitimize its international disposal of grain
surpluses. Yet in a system oriented toward free trade, participants’ acquies
cence in extramarket distribution could be obtained only on the stipulation
that market distribution was to take precedence over extramarket distribu
tion. Therefore, food aid was acceptable to American and foreign producers
and exporters as long as aid did not dramatically reduce income from trade
or distort market shares. Rules to this effect were explicitly codified in na
tional and international law. One example is the “usual marketing require
ment,’’ which demands that a food-aid recipient must import commercially,
in addition to food aid received, an amount equal to its average imports of
the preceding five years.
Avoidance of starvation. The accepted international obligation to pre
vent starvation is not peculiar to the postwar period; it derives from more
remote times. There has been and remains a consensus that famines are
extraordinary situations and that they should be met by extraordinary and
charitable means.
The free flow of scientific and crop information. Whereas most of the
other norms of the international food regime (and, more specifically, the
wheat regime) emerged during the postwar era largely because of American
advocacy and practice, “free information’’ emerged in spite of U.S. misgiv
ings. Freedom of information about the results of agricultural research was a
notion nurtured by the FAO and welcomed by those seeking technology for
development. With American acquiescence, especially after 1970, it became
a norm of the food regime and has become nearly universal. The same is true
of production information: even the Soviets now acquiesce to American and
FAO reporting requirements on their current crops.
Low priority for national self-reliance. Partly because the global food
system of the past thirty years was perceived by most participants as one of
relative abundance and partly because of international divisions of labor im
plicit in free-trade philosophies, national self-reliance in food was not a norm
of the international food regime. Indeed, food dependence was encouraged
and becoming dependent upon external suppliers was accepted as legitimate
and responsible international behavior. World Bank and World Food
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Council efforts to conduct national food-sector studies in the most depen
dent food importers, begun in 1980, are explicit challenges to this norm.^^
Measures that reduce dependence in rich importers, such as the Common
Agricultural Policy of the EEC and the subsidization of domestic rice pro
duction in Japan, also conflict with this norm implicitly. Such policies, how
ever, reflect domestic political pressures rather than explicit goals of food
self-reliance; hence they do not directly conflict with the emphasis on food
trade per se.
National sovereignty and the illegitimacy of external penetration. The
international food system of the last thirty years existed within the confines
of the international political system, so that principles governing the latter
necessarily conditioned norms of the food regime. Among them, the general
acceptance of the principle of national sovereignty largely proscribed exter
nal interference or penetration into matters defined as “domestic” affairs. In
practice this meant that food production, distribution, and consumption
within countries, and the official policies that regulated them, remained be
yond the legitimate reach of the international community; a “look the other
way” ethic prevailed even in the face of officially perpetrated inhumanities
in a number of countries. Relief for starving Ethiopians in 1973-74 was de
layed a year, for example, by adherence to this norm.®®
Low concern about chronic hunger. That international transactions in
food should be addressed to alleviating hunger and malnutrition, or that
these concerns should take priority over other goals such as profit maximi
zation, market stability or political gains, were notions somewhat alien to the
international food regime of the postwar era. It was simply not a rule of
international food diplomacy that hunger questions should be given high
priority, or, in some instances, it was not considered appropriate that they
should even be raised when there was a danger of embarrassing or insulting a
friendly country by exposing malnutrition among its citizens. President
Carter, for example, established a World Hunger Commission, but its report
was considered so unimportant that it took over three months in 1980 to
secure an appointment to deliver it officially to the president.
Regime consequences
Some effects of the prevailing food regime upon the international food
system during the postwar era are easily discernible. In setting and enforc
ing regime norms for commercial transactions, the United States worked out
trading rules in conjunction with key importers and other exporters. The
most formal expressions came in the series of international wheat
agreements, beginning in 1949. Communist countries remained peripheral
^ Other challenges to this norm may be found in the works of revisionists such as Frances
Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins, Food First (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977).
“ See Jack Shephard, The Politics of Starvation (New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1975).
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participants in these arrangements. They worked out their own rules within
COMECON, although they occasionally interacted with “western” food
traders, playing by western rules when they did. World trade in foodstuffs
attained unprecedented absolute levels, and North Americans became grain
merchants to the world to an unprecedented degree. Through concessional
transactions the major problems of oversupply and instability in the com
mercial markets were resolved. Surpluses were disposed of in ways that
enhanced the prospects for subsequent growth of commercial trade by the
major food suppliers. Especially with respect to grain trading, adherence to
regime norms enhanced the wealth and power (i.e., market share and con
trol) of major exporters, most notably farmers and trading firms in the
United States. The nutritional well-being and general standard of living of
fairly broad cross-sections of populations were also enhanced within major
grain-importing countries. Adhering to regime norms, however, also en
couraged interdependence among exporters and importers, an interde
pendence that, over time, limited the international autonomy and flexibility
of both. With regard to concessional food flows, regime norms facilitated
global humanitarianism and enhanced survival during shortfalls and famines.
In absolute terms no major famine has occurred in the world since the Ben
gal famine in 1943. The availability of food on a concessional basis also
undoubtedly alleviated some miseries in a number of aided countries. On the
other hand regime norms also contributed to huge gaps in living standards
between richer and poorer countries; they helped to perpetuate large gaps
between rich and poor within countries; and they failed to correct chronic
nutritional inadequacies of poor people worldwide. By promoting transfers
of certain types of production technology as well as foodstuffs, the food
regime also contributed to the spread of more capital-intensive farming and
specialized rather than self-reliant crop choices. Overall, the food regime
reflected and probably reinforced the global political-economic status quo
that prevailed from the late 1940s to the early 1970s. It was buttressed by,
and in turn buttressed, the global power structure of American hegemony.
The period 1970-78 was one of substantial instability in markets and
concern for food distribution, food insecurity, and malnutrition. In 1963,
when crop failure led the Soviets to make large international purchases, re
sources in the form of large surplus stocks in the West were available to
smooth adjustments. But in 1972 world grain production lagged and trade
rose sharply, and such resources were not available in the 1973-75 period.
Production actually declined worldwide and the traded tonnage expanded
dramatically, and wheat prices tripled in the two years between the summer
of 1972 and 1974. Sufficient concern was aroused both in and beyond the
circle of elite regime managers that a World Food Conference was held in
November 1974, to institute a series of reforms in the regime. Three sub
stantive major defects in the world food system, as well as many minor ones,
were identified at the Conference. The first was inadequate food reserves to
assure reasonable stability in markets and security for consumers; second.
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the use of food aid in ways that reflected low priority for the food problems
of less developed countries; and third, inadequate and inappropriate invest
ment flows with respect to food production capacity in food-deficit areas.
These defects arose because behavior according to regime norms,
which previously had not led to a conflict between domestic and interna
tional interests, now did so. The stockpiles that had guaranteed international
price stability (though not the food security of those unable to buy food) had
not been created or maintained with the purpose of providing international
stability. No norm had been institutionalized that prescribed reserves for
international purposes. Reserves, held mainly by the United States and
Canada, had been largely a function of political and economic responses to
the income demands of the politically significant farm populations in ex
porting countries. The norm held that adjustment to market conditions was a
national responsibility. When reserves were no longer required for adjust
ment purposes in North America they were gladly, not cautiously, depleted.
Similarly, for the most part food aid had been an attractive means of foreign
assistance precisely because surplus stocks overhanging markets were
thought undesirable. Food aid was a mechanism to reduce such stocks and
to promote new markets. In addition, the largest donor, the United States,
allocated the bulk of its food aid on the basis of political rather than nutri
tional criteria and in direct proportion to the size of American stocks. When
food was no longer in surplus, nutritional and international welfare interests
did not command enough influence to maintain food-aid levels or even to
control allocations of diminished aid. Dietary adequacy in poorer countries
was not prescribed by the regime. Thus, Egypt, South Korea, Taiwan, Israel,
and even Chile got aid, while near-famine occurred in Bangladesh. Finally,
investment in food production, especially in poor countries, was low be
cause it was not seen as attractive by the dominant philosophy of economic
development—import-substituting industrialization. Nor was it relevant to
the largest motivation that shaped private capital flows, namely, the search
for cheap sources of supply. As noted, agricultural development was not
prescribed by the regime. These considerations abetted the transfer of
existing rather than new technologies, and leaned agamst investment in
rural areas and in food crops for local consumption (as opposed to fibers or
tropical products such as coffee, tea, and pineapples). The outlook for man
agers of the food regime was shaped by their positions and the rewards for
these positions. Food affairs were generally not decided in ministries of de
velopment, let alone ministries of health. Rather, they were managed by
agriculture and trade officials, and served their understanding of interests
and goals. The international arena, for them, was largely a means for solving
domestic problems through market development or surplus disposal. Goals
of public health, political stability, and general economic development were
at best given lip service in the calculations and actions of the food regime’s
managers.
In the seven years since the World Food Conference, has the regime
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changed? The answer is “marginally,” and by evolution. First, there has
come to be a greater emphasis on rural development. Growing more food has
received high priority at the World Bank and in the efforts of national foreign
assistance agencies, especially in food-scarce countries. New norms em
phasizing food in development planning have been codified by a special
conference on rural development held in Rome in 1979 and by continuing
World Food Council resolutions. Finally a new lending agency, the Interna
tional Fund for Agricultural Development, has been established (1977). A
second change is that greater security for food-aid recipients has been as
sured. This results from a new Food Aid Convention, agreed to in March
1980, which raised the minimum aid donor pledges from four-and-one-half to
eight million tons, and from the four-million-ton emergency international
wheat reserve of the United States signed into law in January 1981. New
norms formalized by the WFP established the legitimacy and stressed the
urgency of these steps. Such norms have also prompted policy changes in
major countries. The United States adopted a Title III program—food aid
for development—that increased its concessional aid. A violation of older,
nonintervention norms is reflected in the way this aid intervenes in the
domestic food policy of aid recipients. Another norm change is reflected in
increased programming of food aid according to nutritional rather than po
litical criteria, which has occurred in the food aid programs of the WFP,
Australia, Canada, and Europe.
These changes constitute the evolution of new norms that challenge the
priority of market principles and give higher priority to chronic hunger, food
security, and food self-reliance. Such norms have been explicitly promoted
by international conferences, by the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, and
by the Brandt and Carter Hunger Commissions.
In other respects the tenets of the old regime prevail, and priorities re
main as they were in the early 1970s. National policies dominate interna
tional policies and “free market” mechanisms are still held to be ideal for the
bulk of food allocations flowing in international channels. With respect to
reserves to increase stability and security, progress has been limited. The
total flow of food aid remains about one-half that of the mid 1960s in volume,
and less than half on a per capita basis. A larger proportion, however, now
goes to least-developed countries—85 percent, up from about 50 percent.
Food security remains tenuous. The internationally coordinated system
of reserves for food security called for at the World Food Conference has not
been created. World stocks, which have increased since 1974, are still less
than half the average size of stocks in the 1950s and 1960s.
All current trends suggest that food deficits will grow in a number of
regions of the world, particularly in Asia and Africa. Furthermore, the rising
cost of production, ecological deterioration, and the decline of subsistence
agriculture all point to increasing vulnerability in the relationship between
food supplies and needy customers. Regime changes since 1974 to cope with
this problem of maldistribution are almost certainly inadequate.
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We expect that the higher degree of formalization of the food regime
and its large number of voluntary participants will lead to continuing and
accelerated efforts to change substantially the norms of the food regime.
These efforts wilt occur within the frameworks of public and private
organizations—United Nations agencies, special forums and secretariats,
centers, councils, committees, conferences, and companies. Setting the
rules of the game wUl remain the prerogative of powerful national govern
ments, especially those whose foodstuffs dominate in trade and aid flows,
and in particular the United States. To the extent that there has been incre
mental change in the global food regime, pressures from formal international
institutions have been helpful. Periodic meetings of international organiza
tions have compelled governments to think and rethink their policies, and to
defend them. If goal change in the regime has been the result of learning, the
institutions and organizations of the food regime have been the classrooms.
Otherwise, the food regime does not look very different or function very
differently from other regimes. Its principles have legitimized unequal dis
tributions of food and unequal distributions of benefits from buying and
selling food. Its norms have given authority to the powerful, both informally
and in formal international bodies. Interestingly, though, there has been little
formulation or articulation of revolutionary norms. Suggestions of move
ment toward revolutionary change have been more prominent in American
“hunger” groups than in speeches by leaders of the Group of 77. In short,
there has been some evolutionary change but no major challenge to the cen
tral principles of the regime.

Conclusions
Regimes in the 1980s, nevertheless, seem more to be under construction
(or perhaps reconstruction) than destruction. This is a consequence, we be
lieve, of changing conditions in which either prevailing regime principles and
norms have proved inadequate in serving the principles of powerful groups
or norms themselves have come under challenge as wrong. The decline of
U.S. hegemony and the attendant reduction in resources available for en
forcing norms buttressed by American power have created challenges to
existing regimes. Disagreements have arisen over appropriate norms in the
areas of trade, oU, food, and even nuclear security. These disagreements
could indicate the rise of a new anomie as a condition in international affairs
or, as we believe, they could be ushering in new normative orders buttressed
by new distributions of power and higher degrees of international organiza
tion.^®
.
Talcot Parsons, for example, argues that anomie is the absence of norms while its opposite
mstitutionalization, is marked by structured complementarity of norms. See The Social Svstem
(New York: Free Press, 1%4), p. 39.
^
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Six general conclusions
Our two cases, colonialism and food, suggest some conclusions. They
are hardly definitive or universal, but they might be subject to broader
generalization and further refinement.
Without intending to be trivial let us first underline that regimes exist. In
international relations there are revered principles, explicit and implicit
norms, and written and unwritten rules, that are recognized by actors and
that govern their behavior. Adherence to regimes may impose a modicum of
order on international interactions and transactions. Our two case studies
demonstrate that actors are guided by norms in diverse issue-areas. We
would suggest that regimes exist in all areas of international relations, even
those, such as major-power rivalry, that are traditionally looked upon as
clear-cut examples of anarchy. Statesmen nearly always perceive them
selves as constrained by principles, norms, and rules that prescribe and
proscribe varieties of behavior.
rt Second, taking regimes into account contributes to explaining interna
tional behavior by alerting students of international affairs to subjective and
moral factors that they might otherwise overlook. Once this subjective di
mension of international relations is included, explanations of international
behavior can be pushed beyond factors such as goals, interests, and power.
Our case study reveals that regimes mediate between goals, interests, and
power on the one hand, and behavior on the other. Such normative media
tion is most effective, and hence most theoretically significant, between two
limiting sets of conditions. At one extreme, a regime may be an empty facade
that rationalizes the rule of the powerful by elevating their preferences to the
status of norms. Under such conditions a regime exists because subordinate
actors recognize the rules and abide by them, but knowing this would not
significantly improve upon our ability to explain behavior as all we would
need to know are the identities of the powerful and their interests and goals.
Under the colonial regime, for example, knowledge of norms contributed
little to explaining the dominance of metropoles over colonies. Similarly,
under the food regime, the knowledge that there were norms revering free
markets does not contribute greatly to explaining major trends in the trading
behavior of the major exporters. These actors pressed for free trade because
it was in their interest. Promoting the liberal doctrine itself was largely inci
dental, and exceptions were made when this doctrine was countered by
powerful national (domestic) interests.
^
At the other extreme are conditions where regimes are determinative,
where codified international law or morality is the primary guide to behavior,
and where the separate goals, interests or capabilities of actors are inconse
quential. Such conditions are extraordinarily rare in international relations.
Where they prevail (in narrow, highly technical issue-areas like smallpox
control or international posts and telegrams) consequent international be
havior is analytically uninteresting. One area where a regime could evolve to

International regimes

87

become determinative is the oceans; the Law of the Sea deserves close
watching by regime analysts.
Between the limits of major-power hegemony and legal or moral order is
a rather broad range of international relations where regimes mediate be
havior largely by constraining unilateral adventurousness or obduracy. The
case studies suggest conditions under which such normative mediation takes
place. For example, it occurs in relations among powers of comparable
capability, where the exertion of force cannot serve interests. Here, norms
and rules tend to order oligarchies, establishing the terms of a stable and
peaceful relationship, mediating and moderating conflict, and preserving
collective status and prerogatives against outsiders. Relations among the
colonial powers, for example, were obviously mediated by norms, and
knowing this adds to our ability to explain behavior that had large conse
quences for colonial regions. Under the food regime, exporters’ direct and
indirect relations with each other were mediated by norms such as those
proscribing concessional dealings until commercial markets were cleared.
Knowing about these norms and their impacts helps to explain behavior that
otherwise might be puzzling. Why, for example, did Americans or Cana
dians not fully push their competitive advantages when they held food
supplies that could be sold at discount prices? Why also did they tacitly
compensate for lost markets between them?
Regimes also mediate under conditions of diffused power, or under
conditions where asymmetries in power are neutralized, as in one-stateone-vote international forums. Here, consensus about appropriate
decision-making procedures and their legitimacy keeps pluralism from de
teriorating into anarchy, and consensus about legitimate objectives makes
policy possible. Artificial equalization of power in the United Nations Gen
eral Assembly and the Committee of Twenty-Four was one of the factors
that forced colonial powers to begin to comply with norms that eventually
became components of a decolonization regime. Similar circumstances in
FAO congresses helped to bring the United States to participate more fully
in the international exchange of agronomic information, and to accept norms
concerning the free flow of information and a higher floor for food aid.
^ Finally, regimes mediate during transitions of power. They tend to have
inertia or functional autonomy and continue to influence behavior even
though their norms have ceased either to reflect the preferences of powers or
to be buttressed by their capabilities. This is one of the most fascinating and
useful aspects of regime analysis, where compliance with norms explains
why patterns of behavior continue long after reasoning in terms of power and
interest suggests that they should have disappeared. For example, decoloni
zation might have been a phenomenon of the 1930s instead of the 1960s had
Asian and African nationalists dared sooner to challenge European im
perialism with force. Similarly, French withdrawal from empire might have
been less prolonged and less destabilizing within France had governments
of the Fourth Republic less reverently espoused discredited norms of the
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colonial regime (and realized, as De Gaulle did, that most of the French had
long since abandoned the colonial ethos). In the same vein, a lingering ac
ceptance of the tenet that it is more appropriate to address food shortages by
importing food than by growing it contributed to the severity of the global
food crisis of the early 1970s. And a lingering endearment with the notion
that the American and Canadian governments will duopolistically buffer
grain prices in the interest of global stability may now be contributing to a
new food crisis, even though neither government has either interest in or
adequate capability for making domestic adjustments for global stability.
^
Our third conclusion is that functionally specific and functionally diffuse
regimes differ importantly with regard to the locus of management and the
nature of managers. Functionally specific regimes such as the food regime
are directed by technical specialists and middle-echelon administrators in
participating governments. Such officials are recruited for their expertise
and skills, traits that are well dispersed internationally. As a result, specific
regimes tend to follow rather democratic procedures, at least as concerns
policies pursued by managers. By contrast, functionally diffuse regimes such
as the colonial regime are more often managed by diplomatic generalists and
higher-level political officers. Not only does this suggest that diffuse regimes
are likely to be much more highly politicized than specific ones, but also that
conflicts which arise in the contexts of various regimes will be different.
Resistance to issue linkage, for example, will be more common in specific
regimes, where managers will variously seek to insulate (or, alternatively,
expand) their jurisdictional domains. On the other hand, difficulties in en
forcing norms, and greater deviance and regime challenges, are likely in dif
fuse regimes.
^
Fourth, international regimes are formalized in varying degrees. Our
analysis suggests that degrees of formality tend to have relatively little to do
with the effectiveness of regimes measured in terms of the probabilities of
participants’ compliance. With the two regimes we considered, one formal
and one informal, both predictably and consistently constrained most par
ticipants’ behavior over considerable periods of time. The colonial case
suggests that some of the most effective regimes are those that are quite
informal. This would seem to be true especially for regimes that regulate the
general political behavior of major powers. “Understandings,” “gentle
men’s agreements,” expected reciprocities, expected restraints, and pre
dicted reactions, largely informal and uncodified, are important determi
nants of major power behavior. It is not accidental, moreover, that major
power behavior is more likely to be subject to informal instead of formal
expressions of principles and norms. Low hierarchy among major states re
duces authority based upon raw power among them. But part of the ethos of
major-power status is that great states must appear to be able to act in an
unrestrained manner. No government of a major power wishes to appear
constrained, least of all by a rival power. Yet we observe in cases such as the
colonial one that powers usually are constrained, and statesmen recognize
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this; but statesmen can behave “according to the rules” more readily when
no one formalizes them.^^
While there may be few differences in the effectiveness of formal and
informal regimes, our analyses suggest that “formalization” itself may be a
dynamic factor. Regimes tend to become more formal over time, as with the
colonial regime, where multilateral diplomatic conferences became increas
ingly important in the latter years of the imperial system; or with the food
regime, where organizations, institutions, and rules seem now to be pro
liferating to fill a void in management created by American reluctance to pro
vide informal leadership. We believe that regimes formalize over time
because maintenance often comes in one way or another to require explicit
ness. As those rewarded by a regime’s functioning become either accus
tomed to or dependent upon such benefits, they tend to formalize interaction
patterns in order to perpetuate them. As elites change, “understandings”
and “gentlemen’s agreements” have a way of getting confused or reinter
preted, and formalization becomes necessary to preserve established norms
and procedures. As challenges to a status quo preserved by a regime arise,
maintaining orthodoxy comes to require explicit doctrine and more formal
commitment; or, contrariwise, as a new regime emerges to replace a-dis
credited older one, proponents of change might press for formalization as a
hedge against reaction. Formalization thus might represent the apogee of a
regime’s influence, the first symbol of its prevalence, or the beginning of its
decline. In all these instances, changes in formality seem to be related to
shifts in the capability of dominant actors to manage or control.
5^ Fifth, effectiveness in terms of compliance with rules and procedures of
any given regime depends largely upon the consensus or acquiescence of
participants. Formal enforcement is extraordinary and coercive enforcement
is rare despite its prevalence in relations between metropoles and colonies
during the colonial era. Usually it is self-interest, broadly perceived, that
motivates compliance.
Explaining why actors choose to exercise self-restraint and to behave
compliantly, especially if such behavior differs from that prescribed by
“purely selfish” interests, is rather involved. First, in most international
regimes a certain degree of unorthodox behavior is tolerated and not taken
as a challenge to the regime, since no international regime embodies en
forcement mechanisms capable of controlling all deviance. Dumping and
other questionable trading practices are intermittently engaged in by partici
pants in the food regime, for example. Similarly, despite the “glass house”
tenets of the colonial regime there was occasional “stone throwing” ; King
Leopold’s Congo was one noteworthy target. Hence one answer to why ac
tors comply with regime norms contrary to their selfish interest is simply that
Michael Mandelbaum, for example, believes that important but informal principles and
norms exist with respect to nuclear weapons. Our thanks for his comments at the Palm Springs
Conference, 27 February 1981.
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they do not always comply. But such deviance is usually inconsequential or
short-lived.
On the other hand, those who customarily comply with regime norms do
so sometimes because they value the regime itself. These participants have
no wish to establish precedents that might cause unorthodox behavior to
proliferate and eventually to destroy the regime. This is one of the reasons
for compliance with norms of the food regime that assign low priority to
nutritional questions and define starvation as a national problem until an
affected government chooses to request international assistance.
But such “regime-mindedness” is probably a lesser reason for com
pliance. More common is compliance out of calculated self-interest. Most
participants in international regimes, whether they are advantaged or disad
vantaged under the regime’s normative biases, usually comply because
compliance is calculated to be more rewarding or less costly than deviance.
Saying this is perhaps pushing the obvious. But what is intriguing is how
regime participants calculate their benefits and costs, and especially how
they assign weights to perceived “moral” benefits of acting in accord with
norms, or perceived “moral” costs of acting against them. It is a tantalizing
observation that patterns of compliance with regime norms, and hence the
stability of regimes, may result from the faulty cost-benefit calculations of
participants who exaggerate the importance of norms or the degree to which
they are hallowed by actors who back them with power.
Sixth and finally, our comparative case studies of regimes suggest that
regime change is closely linked to two classical political concepts power
and interest. Most regime change results from changes in the structure of
international power. For diffuse regimes, the relevant power structure is the
global political-strategic balance, as was the case with the colonial reginie,
which began to change when major powers such as Russia (the Soviet
Union) and the United States defected from the normative consensus. On
the other hand, for more functionally specific regimes, relevant power also
must include command over specific resources within particular issue-areas,
as with the oil companies during the 1930s and the oil states in the 1970s, and
the food-supplying states in the food regime. Of course, principles such as
sovereignty may extend from the diffuse state system to affect or be part of
the features of these specific regimes as well.
Revolutionary change is the more frequent pattern of regime change,
and such change most often comes after changes in the structure of power.
On the other hand, regime change via cognitive learning and the recasting
of goals among dominant elites alfo occurs. This evolutionary change seems
less frequent than revolutionary change, perhaps because major wars, from
the Thirty Years War to World War II, have preceded and been instrumental
in regime change.
Regime change without significant changes in power structure occurs
when leading elites seek to preserve their status and their control of the
regime by eliminating “dysfunctional” behavior, either in the substantive
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performance or in the decision procedures of a regime. This results when
learning and technology foster new or changed goals. Changes in interests
and goals have arisen from expanding knowledge of the world and its en
vironmental exigencies. New understanding and capability with respect to
disease, food technology, and air travel are important instances of regime
change and even regime creation. The norm that no one should be hungry is
not accepted by the current food regime, but it has sparked major efforts at
regime change, including the creation of international reserves and external
aid to increase food production in areas of the world that are most chroni
cally malnourished. Unfortunately, it is only rarely the case that controlling
elites—especially the fragmented and oligarchic elites of the international
system—learn enough in sufficient time to change from within.

